but it is a far broader theme. Discernment is called for whether or not one is faced with a decision. The whole of what we have come to call the examination of consciousness is a matter of discernment, and the examination of consciousness is frequently carried out independently of any need to make a decision. Discernment is about Befindlichkeit, how one finds oneself, which for Heidegger is equiprimordial with Verstehen as constitutive of Da-sein. It is because of the relation to one another of discernment and election that I will discuss them together, but we must keep in mind the distinction as well.
In the discussion of these Ignatian themes of election, discernment, and consolation as they appear in Lonergan"s writings, there will emerge one further Ignatian characteristic of Lonergan"s work, namely, the place of the Trinity at the heart of Lonergan"s worldview. And from that Trinitarian mysticism I will move to and conclude with some suggestions regarding the Ignatian rules for thinking with the Church.
The Ignatian Ethos of Insight

The Greater Good
In this section I emphasize that Lonergan"s concern for culture, for ultimate issues, longterm results, theoretical questions, hard work, especially as these are reflected in chapter 7 of Insight, reflect the Ignatian concern for the greater good.
While I was working my way for the first time through Insight in the summer of 1967, I asked myself, "What would I say about the author of this book if I knew absolutely nothing about him except his name?" I came up with two answers to that question. The first was -and I hope I may say this without offending anyone, since I am a citizen of both the United States and Canada -that the author was probably not an American. The second was that the author was probably profoundly influenced by the
Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius. 4 4
Now, of course, I already knew that both of these suppositions were true, or at least that the first was definitely true, since I knew that Lonergan was a Canadian, and that the second was probably true, since I also knew that he was a Jesuit. My primary reason for responding that the author was probably not an American is that chapter 7 of Insight reflects a view of society in which cultural values, the meanings and values of particular ways of life, have a very serious constitutive role to play in the fabric of the social order. This is a mentality that in my young life to that point I did not identify as American, one that I had not encountered even in American philosophical writings, a mentality that ran counter to the pragmatic orientation even of most American intellectual life in the middle decades of the twentieth century, a mentality that insisted that intellectual and cultural integrity are required for the well-being of the social order. The concern for culture and cultural differences as constitutive of the social order, as autonomous determinants of the way people live, is, I subsequently discovered, something that is, or at least was, much more a part of the Canadian mental fabric than it is of the American mentality. In fact, after moving to Canada in 1979, I discovered that the major difference between the two countries lies precisely here, in the role that culture plays in the social fabric of the country. But, I might add, this concern for culture has become much more precarious in Canada today than it was in the days of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, despite the country"s self-congratulatory comments about the multiculturalism of the nation.
It was the same chapter 7 that first convinced me that the author of the book Insight had been profoundly influenced by the Ignatian Exercises. Lonergan"s respect for culture was a respect not only for the everyday meanings and values of diverse communities of people, but also for the integrity of work at what he later would call the cultural superstructure, at the literary and artistic, scholarly and scientific, philosophical and theological levels where the transcendental concerns for beauty, intelligibility, truth, and the human good are reflected upon and promoted. This commitment to long-range 5 5 effects, ultimate issues, even tough theoretical questions has always been a hallmark of the Society of Jesus, where the Society has remained faithful to its own origins and vocation. Wherever this commitment has been lost or abandoned in the history of the Society, the Society itself has lost its way and has had to be called back to something very important in its service to the Church, just as Fr Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, with mixed results so far, is trying to call the Society back today to the centrality of the intellectual apostolate, precisely for the sake of "the service of faith and the promotion of justice" that we have recognized as partly constitutive of our vocation.
Canadians will be no more let off the hook at this level of Lonergan"s concern than would Americans. Ultimate issues, long-range effects, and tough theoretical questions are not only honored in this book. Concern for them is argued to be an essential ingredient in the well-being of any society. And that insistence is characteristically Ignatian. Canadians, including Canadian Jesuits, are no more immune to what Lonergan calls the general bias of common sense against these specializations than are any others.
Far from it! But Ignatian spirituality does run profoundly counter to the general bias of common sense against the greater good. And so I recognized on my first reading that at this point in chapter 7, without using the word, Lonergan is in fact calling for a profound conversion in the reader"s intellectual life, a conversion that would inspire one to opt for the greater good, for the magis, the more, and, in a religious and Christian and Catholic context, for the greater glory of God, in the very exercise of one"s cognitional operations and in one"s commitment as a knower. While this conversion is not precisely the philosophic conversion from naïve realism that Lonergan is talking about when he employs the term "intellectual conversion" in a technical sense in his later writings, it is the beginning of such a conversion, for it is an openness and dedication to intelligibility and truth as constitutive of human knowing or, more precisely, as constitutive of what human beings know when they are knowing. it consolation when there is excited in the soul some interior motion by which it begins to be inflamed with the love of its Creator and Lord, and when, consequently, it can love no created thing on the face of the earth itself, but only in the Creator of them all. Likewise, when it sheds tears, moving it to the love of its Lord, whether it be from grief for its sins, or from the Passion of Christ our Lord, or from other things directly ordained to His service and praise. Finally, I call consolation every increase of hope, faith, and charity, and all interior joy, which calls and attracts man to heavenly things, and to the salvation of his own soul, rendering it quiet and tranquil in its Creator and Lord." 3 Now what would the consolation be that these two people attested to?
Well, while it is probably true that some people have been reduced to tears when reading Insight, this is not what my Jesuit friends were talking about. Their experience was closer to the first and last instances of consolation that St Ignatius speaks about: an increase of an interior joy, of hope, faith, and charity, and a love of God and of all else in God. This consolation is related to an illumination that Insight can effect: in fact this world is intelligible, things do hold together, we can make sense of the universe and of our lives, we can overcome the fragmentation of knowledge, we can make true Perhaps nowhere is this consolation more the experience of many readers in the strictly philosophical portion of the book, that is, prior to any introduction of the question of God, than in the remarkable chapter 12, "The Notion of Being." The chapter says the following: Being is everything about everything. Being is what would be known in the totality of true judgments. Being is everything that can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed. Apart from being there is nothing. Being is completely concrete and completely universal. Being is incrementally known in every true judgment, but a true judgment is reached precisely as a true judgment only when one knows there are no further questions on a particular issue. So, the chapter implies without explicitly saying it, being is also a task. Reaching being in any concrete instance calls for a cognitive integrity or authenticity that nobody can take for granted either in oneself or in others. Thus the chapter offers a set of clues to a philosophic discrimination of truth and illusion, of the real and the unreal, of the true and the false. That discrimination is anything but automatic. It can entail a prolonged struggle. The struggle is felt in the soul of the reader, in feelings that are truly spiritual in their source, their meaning, and their implications.
The feeling of the discrimination can be the feeling of a battle in which what is at stake is the very integrity of the reader"s intellectual life. There is an existential crisis (not just a cognitive problem) that is entailed in arriving at the three basic philosophical positions of the book Insight, that is, the positions on knowing, on the real as being, and on objectivity. Now I wish to suggest that in its spiritual tonality or "taste" this crisis is a philosophic instantiation of the decisive struggle that St Ignatius portrays in his meditation on the Two Standards. As one making that meditation is to pray for There is something akin in Lonergan to the Buddhist struggle between truth and illusion.
And that struggle is spiritually akin to Ignatius"s struggle between, on the one hand, riches, honor, and pride, and on the other hand poverty, the welcoming of the world"s reproaches and contempt, and humility. And all of these are akin to a ceasing from some great striving, a detachment and disinterestedness, an indifference in the deeply committed Ignatian sense of that term. And in more contemporary Girardian terms all of these are akin to the truthful and humble relinquishment of rivalry and violence, to the converted acceptance of the Johannine Logos in whom all things were made, the Logos that in coming into the world was rejected, the Logos that in being rejected put an end to all violence, the Logos that is quite distinct from the Heraclitean logos for which all is born of conflict and war. For all that Insight might appear to be a book that comes from Athens rather than from Jerusalem, in the last analysis it is a book that began with the author"s love of the one who was murdered outside Jerusalem on a lonely Friday, a book that, because its author was absorbed by what happened to this same figure on the third 10 day, is able to advance what is of worth in Athens and simply to leave the rest to wither away, a book that is able to teach its readers to do the same.
To return, then, to the experience of consolation, Lonergan"s notion of being is invested with a hope that one does not usually find in philosophic meditations on being. It is a hope that informs all of Lonergan"s writings. Recall Ignatius: "I call consolation every increase of hope, faith, and charity …" The hope is precisely what Lonergan articulates once he moves onto explicitly theological terrain in the final chapter of Insight: the "confident hope that God will bring [our] intellect to a knowledge, participation, possession of the unrestricted act of understanding" that God is. 
Insight as a Set of Spiritual Exercises
I will conclude my remarks on Insight with a few indications from the opening pages of the book that would indicate how reading the book will engage one in a set of spiritual exercises.
First, then, just as St Ignatius tells us at the very beginning of the Spiritual
Exercises that the purpose of the Exercises is to prepare and dispose the soul to free itself from all inordinate affections so that it might seek and find the will of God concerning the ordering of life for the salvation of one"s soul, so Lonergan tells us at the beginning of Insight that if we are going to order our cognitional lives around the central act of insight, we will need to recognize the devices that block the occurrence of the insights that would upset our comfortable equilibrium. There is a flight from understanding that is "resourceful and inventive, effective and extraordinarily plausible." Already the reader is being told that by reading this book he or she will be plunged into a struggle that, while cognitive and intellectual and philosophic, is also profoundly existential and spiritual.
Again in the preface, we read this unmistakably Ignatian statement: "Probably I shall be told that I have tried to operate on too broad a front. But I was led to do so for two reasons. In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way; an effort that is in principle incomplete is equivalent to a failure. Moreover, against the flight from understanding half measures are of no avail. Only a comprehensive strategy can be successful. To disregard any stronghold of the flight from understanding is to leave intact a base from which a counteroffensive promptly will be launched. 7 Ibid. 8-9.
12 12 evil that tortures too many human bodies, darkens too many human minds, hardens too many human hearts?"
8 One who has made the Spiritual Exercises might well think at this point of the setting that St Ignatius provides for the first contemplation of the Second Week, on the Incarnation: "I try to enter into the vision of God, in God"s triune life, looking upon our world: people aimless, people despairing, people hateful and killing, people sick and dying, the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the happy and the sad, some being born and some being laid to rest. The leap of divine joy: God knows that the time has come when the mystery of the salvific plan, hidden from the foundation of the world, will become manifest." 9 Lonergan"s writings, even at their most theoretical, are themselves a set of spiritual exercises in the Ignatian tradition.
Election, Discernment, and Trinitarian Mysticism
Two Treatments of Decision in Lonergan, Three Times of Decision in Ignatius
It is now a commonplace among Lonergan students that there are two quite distinct treatments of decision in Lonergan"s writings. choice. In the process one assembles the data, one has a practical insight into what is to be done, one grasps that the evidence supports the practical insight, one judges that this is to be done, one freely chooses to do it. Again, the good is the intelligent and reasonable.
There is no mention in Insight of judgments of value, except in chapter 20 where Lonergan is discussing belief. In Method in Theology, on the other hand, the good is, as Lonergan says, a distinct notion -distinct from the intelligent and reasonable. This does not mean, obviously, that the good is the stupid and silly, but that it is intended in a kind of question that is distinct from the question for intelligence, What is it? and the question The first is not overshadowed by the second. Rather, they mark distinct times of making decisions. They are both permeated by love and grace. And the criteria of both accounts must be satisfied in every decision that we make. 14 14
The basis for my position is not found in Lonergan, but in Ignatius. Lonergan"s two approaches to decision-making can be related to, mapped onto, Ignatius"s times of election. In fact, Ignatius proposes "Three Times, In Each of Which a Sound and Good Election May Be Made."
The first time is when God our Lord so moves and attracts the will, that, without doubt or the power of doubting, such a devoted soul follows what has been pointed out to it, as St Paul and St Matthew did when they followed Christ our Lord.
The second time is when much light and knowledge is obtained by experiencing consolations and desolations, and by experience of the discernment of various spirits.
The third time is one of tranquility: when one considers, first, for what one is born, that is, to praise God our Lord, and to save one"s soul; and when, desiring this, one chooses as the means to this end a kind or state of life within the bounds of the Church, in order that one may thereby be helped to serve God our Lord, and to save one"s soul. I said a time of tranquility; that is, when the soul is not agitated by divers spirits, but enjoys the use of its natural powers freely and quietly. Let me make the following four points.
First, the times of decision that Ignatius proposes are exhaustive. Either God has moved one in such a way that one has no doubts as to what one is to do, and then one is in the first time, or God has not so moved one, and so one has questions, and then one is in either the second or the third time. In the latter case, either one is tranquil or one is agitated by various pulls and counterpulls. If one is agitated by various pulls and counterpulls, one is in the second time. One is not free to exercise one"s natural powers of intelligence and reason but must rely on various guidelines for discerning what is good and what is not. If one is not agitated, one is in the third time, and then one is free to employ one"s natural powers to arrive at judgments of value and decisions that, in Lonergan"s terms, will acknowledge particular goods and goods of order as genuine values precisely because they are possible objects of rational choice.
Second, there is a complementarity between the second and third times in Ignatius, or between the two presentations in Lonergan. That is, the judgment of value and the decision that one arrives at in Ignatius"s second time, by discerning pulls and counterpulls, must be able to be adjudicated as well by the criteria of intelligence, reason, and responsibility that are explicitly appealed to in the third time. And the judgments of value and decisions that are arrived at in the third time must produce the same "peace of a Fourth, the presentation that is found in Method in Theology is relevant, not to Ignatius"s third time but to his second time of election. For here it is self-transcendent 17 affectivity, affectivity that matches the unrestricted reach of the notion of value, the affectivity of a person in love in an unqualified fashion, that provides the criteria for the decision. Which course of action reflects, embodies, incarnates the self-transcendent love that matches the reach of the transcendental notion of value? The answer to that question gives the indication as to the direction in which one is to go as one heads towards a judgment of value and a consequent decision. All of this is confirmed by the considerations that Ignatius places in the second week of the Exercises precisely in the context of heading toward the election: the Two Standards, the Three Classes of Persons, the Three Degrees of Humility. All are beckoning to the total response of selftranscendent love.
Trinitarian Mysticism
It is a matter of great interest, I think, that Lonergan"s two accounts of decision provide the elements also of two distinct but complementary approaches to a psychological In the first psychological analogy found in Lonergan"s work, that which is presented in intricate detail in the systematic part of his work De Deo Trino, the analogue in the creature is found in those moments of existential self-constitution in which we grasp the sufficiency of evidence regarding what it would be good for one to be, utter the judgment of value, "This is good," and proceed to decisions commensurate with that grasp of evidence and judgment of value. From the act of grasping the evidence there proceeds the act of judging value, and from the two together there proceeds the love that 18 18 embraces the good and carries it out. So too in divine self-constitution, from the Father"s grasp of the grounds for affirming the goodness of all that the Father is and knows, there proceeds the eternal Word of the Father saying Yes to it all, and from the Father and the Word together there proceeds the eternal Love that is the Holy Spirit. This theology of God"s own self-constitution in knowledge, word, and love is informed by an analogy with human rational self-consciousness as Lonergan has understood it in Insight. One"s self-appropriation of one"s rational self-consciousness in the form in which it is presented in Insight, or again as it functions in St Ignatius"s third time of election, will ultimately entail a recognition of those processes, those processions, as constituting an image of the Trinitarian processions themselves.
But in his later work Lonergan proposes a distinct psychological analogy for the Trinity, one that is more closely related to the account of decision in Method in Theology and so to St Ignatius"s first and second times of election. Here is what he says:
The psychological analogy … has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.
Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho Theos, who is identified with agapē (1 John 4:8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its
Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit. As moral integrity, according to the presentation in Method in Theology, is a function of generating the judgments of value of a person who is in love in an unqualified way, and as those judgments of value are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving, so the Father now is infinite and eternal being-in-love, an agapē that generates a Word, the eternal Yes that is the Son, a Word that breathes love, a Yes that grounds the Proceeding Love that is breathed forth as from agapē and from its manifestation in such a Word. it be to participate in the Incarnate Son, who himself is an imitation of "Abba"? "… love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you; in this way you will be children of your Father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest alike." As the Holy Spirit proceeds from the agapē that is the Father and the Word that the Father utters in saying Yes to God"s own goodness, so the habit of charity -a love that extends to enemies and that gives sunshine and rain to all alike -flows from our created participation in and imitation of that active spiration, that is, from the entitative change that is the grace that makes us not only pleasing to God, gratia gratum faciens, but somehow imitative of the divine goodness.
"You must therefore be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect." In this participation and imitation, this mimesis, if you will, we are moved beyond the otherwise endless cycle of violence, recrimination, judgment, blame, accusation, murder, hate, and false religion.
So this habit of grace sets up a state of grace, even as it is set up by the state of grace, where the state of grace is a social situation, an intersubjective set of relationships, where the founding subjects, as it were, are the three divine subjects, and where grace prevails because they have come to dwell in us and with us.
In the first, natural analogy, the analogy that recognizes in human nature an image of the Trinitarian processions, love flows from knowledge and word, as Lonergan emphasizes over and over again in De Deo Trino. In the second, supernatural analogy, the analogy that recognizes that grace makes us not only images of but also participants in the Trinitarian relations, the dynamic state of being in love precedes our knowledge, and it gives rise to the knowledge that is known as faith, where faith is understood as the knowledge born of being in love with God: more precisely, the grasp of evidence that is possible only for such a lover and the judgments of value that proceed from that grasp.
But more radically, it must be said, here too love flows from knowledge, but not from our knowledge. It flows, rather, from the verbum spirans amorem, the word breathing love, that is the image of the eternal Father, the Word who himself proceeds from eternity as the Father"s judgment of value pronouncing an infinite Yes to God"s own goodness. And in this case the psychological analogue for the Trinitarian processions, while it is still a created analogue, is no longer a natural analogue. For the dynamic state of being in love that is the analogue for the divine Father is itself the supernatural created habitual grace that we have known as sanctifying grace. And so the psychological analogy now provides, not simply an image of the Trinitarian processions, but a participation in them and an imitation, a mimesis, of them.
And so to return for a moment to the times of election: (1) in the third time, we employ our natural powers of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding to arrive at good decisions, and in so doing we are embodying the natural analogue for the divine processions, where we are images of the Trinity; (2) in the second time, we are discerning the pulls and counterpulls of affective resonances, so as to arrive at decisions that will promote in us not only the image of the Trinity but participations in the divine being-in-love uttering the eternal Yes and with that Yes breathing the eternal Proceeding Love, and so that will enable us to be not only images of but also participants in the divine processions; and (3) in the first time, that dynamic state of being in love and its word of value judgment are so dominant that the loving decisions and actions flow 22 22 spontaneously forth from them in a way that admits no doubt as to where they come from or whose life is being reflected in them: "I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me."
Consolation without a Cause
This brings us quite spontaneously and organically to the discussion of consolation without a cause, which I think we can discuss quite briefly. Lonergan refers approvingly to Karl Rahner"s understanding of Ignatian consolation without a cause as consolation with a content but without an apprehended object. David Fleming"s contemporary reading of the Spiritual Exercises seems to support this interpretation. "We know the experience of having certain thoughts, achievements, or events which bring about a feeling of great consolation in our lives. We also know the effect of another person or persons whose very presence or conversation can give us joy. But we can more readily attribute our consolation directly to the touch of God when there is no thought, no event, no person -in general, no object of any sort -which seems to be the source of such a movement … in these cases, we should be aware that God is truly said to be the direct source of all our consolation." three. There is a minor exception to this rule inasmuch as people do fall in love, and that falling in love is something disproportionate to its causes, conditions, occasions, antecedents. For falling in love is a new beginning, an exercise of vertical liberty in which one"s world undergoes a new organization. But the major exception to the Latin tag is God"s gift of his love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of being in love. But who it is we love, is neither given nor as yet understood.
Our capacity for moral self-transcendence has found a fulfilment that brings deep joy and profound peace. Our love reveals to us values we had not appreciated, values of prayer and worship, of repentance and belief. But if we would know what is going on within us, if we would learn to integrate it with the rest of our living, we have to inquire, investigate, seek counsel. So it is that in religious matters love precedes knowledge and, as that love is God"s gift, the very beginning of faith is due to God"s grace.
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A consolation that has a content but no apprehended object is correlated with a reversal of a long-standing philosophical and theological tradition, with the priority of love over knowledge, with the possibility of falling in love without yet knowing who it is that we are in love with. Carlo Maria Cardinal Martini, who presented the keynote address in the Lonergan centenary celebration at the Gregorian University in November of 2004, made a great deal over this reversal in Method in Theology, finding it to be the potential source of a number of radical transformations in the Church"s pastoral theology and practice. In nonintentional feelings "the relation of the feeling to the cause or goal is simply that of effect to cause, of trend to goal. the subsequent periods in which one begins to work out plans or actions or to make resolutions? That is, is Ignatius suggesting something like a distinction of nonintentional and intentional moments and the need for discernment once the dynamic has become intentional? Well, yes and no. Such a conclusion makes sense at least in that we are talking about a consolation that is not a response to an apprehended object. And yet it does not ring completely true to our experience of such consolation. Lonergan provides what we need to solve the conundrum. Since this consolation comes from God and is the fruit of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Word, at its source it is God"s own response to God as God apprehends God. But we do not know that simply by experiencing it. I have already stated that this consolation without a cause does proceed from knowledge, but that the knowledge is not ours, but is identical with the eternal Father and the Father"s only begotten Son, the eternal Word of the Father, the verbum spirans amorem.
Perhaps there is some parallel, even some analogy, that obtains between these two dimensions, human and divine, of the one experience of being in love in an unqualified fashion and the interaction or interrelationship of the two consciousnesses, human and divine, of the one person of the incarnate Word of God. But that is a matter for further exploration.
Rules for Thinking with the Church
With respect to Lonergan"s relation to the Ignatian rules for thinking with the Church, I
wish to take a position that will not paper over what I think are the differences between the explicit statements of Ignatius and the developments found in Lonergan"s latest writings regarding authority in general and, by implication at least, Church authority in particular. But I also want to take a position that acknowledges the continuity. In all fairness to both Lonergan and Ignatius, the topic is one that could demand another paper Second, at several points in his later, post-Method development there seem to be subtle attempts to demythologize the notion of authority. And I use the term "demythologize" with some -authority! That is to say, when Lonergan handed me an offprint of his short but trenchant article "Dialectic of Authority,"
21 he made what I found at the time to be a somewhat cryptic remark to the effect that perhaps much thinking about authority reflects mythic consciousness. When I asked him to elaborate, he declined, but pointed to the article. In this article Lonergan defines authority as legitimate power, and insists that legitimacy is conferred by authenticity. Without authenticity, there may be power but the power is not legitimate, and so there is no authority. In a similar vein, in the paper "Religious Knowledge," 22 he asks about the source of genuine religious conviction. More precisely, he asks, How can one tell whether one"s appropriation of 21 Bernard Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," in A Third Collection 5-12.
22 Bernard Lonergan, "Religious Knowledge," in A Third Collection 129-45. 28 28 religion is genuine or unauthentic and, more radically, how can one tell one is not appropriating a religious tradition that has become unauthentic? After Kierkegaard, I submit, we cannot avoid facing such wrenching questions. Lonergan"s answer relies not on any external authority, even the highest in the Catholic religious world, but on the inner conviction of authenticity generated by self-transcendence. This seems, it must be said, quite different from what is explicitly conveyed in Ignatius"s rules for thinking with the Church (though perhaps not in the rest of the Spiritual Exercises). And the difference is due in part to the fact that we do live in a very different world from that of St Ignatius.
Third, among Catholic, indeed orthodox Catholic, thinkers, none is clearer on this difference of worlds than René Girard, and I think Girard could be used to complement reformanda, always in need of reformation and forgiveness, that the Church of the future will ask forgiveness for the Church"s present complicity in violence, and that the maintenance of a system that controls thought and expression with an authority without authenticity, wherever that occurs, is a remnant of mythic consciousness, a remnant that, while it is no longer believed by most, still exerts its powerful influence in ways that are at times very harmful. Lonergan. Lonergan"s very advance of the Ignatian positions to the point of helping us appropriate the dynamics of the authenticity generated by self-transcendence can be the source of the reversal of the mythic remnants even in the Ignatian text, a reversal that can be done without any fanfare at all if we follow the guidelines of the positive thrust toward self-transcendent love. Reversing counterpositions is always secondary to advancing positions. Expect to find truth, and be disappointed if you do not; rather than expecting to find nonsense, and being surprised if you find something worthwhile. Make the texts you read better than they really are.
Let me return for one more moment to Girard, though. For what I am advocating is not easy, and it is particularly difficult if inauthentic exercise of authority has been harmful to one"s own well-being, or to that of one"s loved ones, if it has marginalized or victimized one or treated one as a scapegoat. The greatest temptation in that case is to engage in reverse scapegoating vis-à-vis the churches and their authorities. This is simply what René Girard calls mimetic violence. With the grace that establishes us in love, it is possible for us to acknowledge injuries while not responding in kind. The one whom we are to imitate, the one who himself imitated the Father who lets his sun to shine on the good and the bad and his rain to fall on the just and the unjust, himself shows the way: "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing." As Girard writes at the very end of his book The Scapegoat, "The time has come for us to forgive one another. If we wait any longer, there will not be time enough." ********* To conclude, I began by speaking of two movements in my paper: influences from Ignatius on Lonergan, and contributions of Lonergan to the development of the Ignatian charism. I hope I have offered some evidence that a fruitful interpretation of Lonergan"s 31 31 entire life"s work would regard it as a massive advance on many fronts of the positions on authentic religion and genuine spirituality that are to be found in the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola.
